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The field of administrative law is an ever-expanding one, due in
large part to the need for particularized regulation in a vast array of
subject areas which cannot adequately be dealt with by the legislature.
Because the legislature must delegate rule-making authority to various
administrative agencies, it is only appropriate that some sort of administrative regulation review be carried out to see that such rule-making
authority is kept within its proper bounds. In this article, the author
engages in a defense of Wyoming's controversial Administrative Regulation Review Act, dealing with its legislative history, its underpinnings
in administrative law, and its day-to-day function. The author goes on
to suggest modifications which would strengthen administrative regulation review in Wyoming.

ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION
REVIEW--ACT II
T. Thomas Singer*
The tension between and among the branches of Wyoming's government was preserved by the state's constitution,1 but it had long national and territorial roots even
then. About the time Wyoming became a state, Professor
Woodrow Wilson was bitterly complaining about the dominance of the executive by the congress.2 Today, the complaints usually concern the excessive power of the president' or the judiciary.' Since 1890, the balance of power
has shifted among the three branches many times.
Copyrighti
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Wyoming Bar. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's
and are not opinions of the Wyoming Legislative Service Office.

1.

Wyo. CONST. art. II,

2.

WILSON,

(1884).
8. See generally
4. Cox,

§

CONGRESSIONAL

1.
GOVERNMENT:

A

STUDY IN

AMERICAN

POLITICS

SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).

THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN

(1976); BiCKxEL, THE

MORALITY OF CONSENT

(1975).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1980

GOVERNMENT

99-118

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 15 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 6

208

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XV

Wyoming's experience with checks and balances may
have been less volatile. A part-time legislature can never
assume the powers of a full-time executive, but the commissions which play such a prominent part in Wyoming
government may have restrained the governor. The level
of tension is generally quite low because of the dominance
by one party in both the executive and legislative branches.
In the past five years, Wyoming's governor has been
a democrat while the legislature has been overwhelmingly
republican. Whether for that reason or others, tensions
between the branches have increased. The legislature has
removed pre-existing gubernatorial powers 5 and imposed
a number of restraints and checks on the governor. One of
those is legislative review of administrative regulations.
It has been slightly more than two years since the
Administrative Regulation Review Act (ARRA) became
law.' In that time, it has engendered many enemies' and
few friends. This article is written by a friend.8 It defends
the ARRA, with some qualifications. While not an effort
to produce an exhaustive legal argument on the constitutional
issues raised by the Act,' the article does state the basic
constitutional and practical reasons for retaining the ARRA.
Section I explains the ARRA's legislative history,
which is useful in understanding the language and purpose
of the Act. Section II states the constitutional argument
which supports the ARRA, and, more importantly, shows
that even though opposition on constitutional grounds is
nothing new to administrative regulation, it survives. The
ARRA appears likely to survive in the same way. Section
5. 1975 Wyo. SESS. LAWS Ch. 145, § 1, repealed the Energy Emergency
Powers Act, 1974 WYo. SESS. LAWS Ch. 22. Governor Hathaway was in
office when the 1974 law was enacted to deal with the energy crisis.
Ed Herschler was governor when it was repealed in 1975.
6. 1977 WYO. SESS. LAWS Ch. 190, § 4 made the Act effective May 27, 1977.
7. The Governor and his former attorney general are certainly on this list,
as is a recent commentator in this review. Comment, Wyoming Administrative Regulation Review Act, 14 LAND & WATEa

L. REV. 189

(1978)

(hereinafter cited as Comment). Also, most agencies dislike the Act.
8. The article is based in part on the author's experiences as a research
assistant for the LSO, where his duties include writing administrative
rule review reports pursuant to the ARRA. WYo. STAT. § 28-9-104(a)
(1977).

9. See Comment, supra note 7, at 195-205.
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III examines the ARRA during its two year life span, and
argues that it has functioned well and improved rulemaking. Some changes in the Act are also proposed.
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The Administrative Rule Review Act's public life
began January 17, 1977, when it was introduced as House
Bill 205. Before that, it had gone through more than a
year of drafting, criticism, redrafting, consulting and reredrafting.
Representative Russ Donley (R-Natrona) drafted an
"Administrative Rule Review Committee" bill for the 1976
budget session, but did not introduce it.'0 In September
of that year, he made some changes in the bill and sent
copies of it to several other legislators 1 and Governor
Herschler. 1
The Governor responded in November. 3 He objected
to the bill because it included a provision permitting a
legislative interim committee to block enforcement of an
agency rule until the legislature met and approved the rule,
and because the definition of "agency" included every political subdivision of the state, which would inundate the
legislature with rules. The Governor also suggested an
alternative to the bill-increasing the governor's power
over promulgation of rules by state agencies.
Donley altered the bill to suit the Governor's wishes. 4
He willingly agreed to restrict the act to state agencies
and to give the governor a veto over agency rules. Donley
noted that the bill, as altered, would create the first joint
executive-legislative rule review procedure. "Reluctantly,"
10. The draft bill was coded 76LS0 015.L1. The information in this paragraph and the two which follow is taken from bill drafts and letters
which are in LSO files on H.B. 205.
11. Letters from Gerald W. Fox, Research Associate, Legislative Service
Office, to Senator Robert Johnson and Representatives Jack Sidi, Warren
Morton and Russell Zimmer (September 22, 1976).
12. Letter from Representative Russ Donley to Governor Ed Herschler
(September 22, 1976).
13. Letter from Governor Ed Herschler to Representative Russ Donley (November 29, 1976).
14. Letter from Representative Russ Donley to Gerald Fox, Research Associate, Legislative Service Office (December 7, 1976).
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Donley agreed to remove the interim committee's authority
to hold rules in abeyance. With those amendments, Donley
approved the bill for prefiling on January 10, 1977. Thus,
before the bill ever entered the legislative mill, the most
controversial and most constitutionally suspect provision,
authority to hold rules in abeyance, was removed to placate
the governor.
As introduced, H.B. 205 created a select standing administrative rules review committee of the legislature."
The committee was authorized to review the rules of any
agency, to compel agencies to assist the committee and its
staff, and to hold hearings. The Legislative Service Office
(LSO) was the committee's staff. Rules were to be filed
with the LSO, which was to review the rules, make determinations and submit recommendations to the committee
and others, including the Management Council. In turn,
the Management Council was to refer the LSO's report to
the standing committee with jurisdiction over the rule-making agency. The rules review committtee would approve
rules or make recommendations to the governor, who had
fifteen days to react, either by complying with the committee's recommendations, or by filing his objections. The
committee could then recommend action to the legislature
at its next session. The legislature could prohibit implementation and enforcement of a rule by adopting the committee's recommendation. Amendments to the Wyoming
Administrative Procedure Act were proposed to conform it
to the rule review procedure.
The bill was assigned to the Rules Committee, of which
Representative Donley was a member. It took the Committee nearly a month to return the bill to the House. The
Committee gave the bill a new number-205A-and reported it out with lengthy amendments which made three
substantive changes. First, the "select administrative rules
review committee," which had been proposed as a permanent legislative interim committee, was eliminated. Its
functions were given to the Management Council, a pre15. H.B. 205, 44th Legis., Gen. Sess. (1977).
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existing legislative committee whose primary responsibility
had been supervising the LSO. By giving the rule review
function to the Management Council, some travel and per
diem costs were saved, and the rule review function was
delegated to the leadership of the legislature."6
Second, the Committee changed the requirement that
rules be "filed in the Legislative Service Office" to a requirement that rules be "submitted to the Legislative
Service Office." The apparent purpose was to make it clear
that the LSO was not going to duplicate the secretary of
state's duties as registrar of rules.
Third, and most significantly, the Committee added a
new subsection (d) to Section 9-4-103 of the Wyoming
Statutes, within the Wyoming Administrative Procedure
Act." The subsection gave the governor a veto over rules
by requiring him to certify that the rules 1) were within
the statutory scope and intent, 2) were adopted in accordance
with law, and 3) met constitutional and statutory requirements, restrictions and standards. If he refused to sign
the rules, they could not be filed or become effective. 8 The
three criteria were the same the Management Council was
to consider in reviewing rules.
The new subsection was the result of a compromise
between the Committee and the Governor."8 The legislative
history of the bill records the compromise in three ways.
First, in spite of relatively strong support among influential
members of the legislature and on the Rules Committee, the
bill languished for over half the session, even though the
Committee had only eight other bills to consider,2" because of
16. Since the Rules Committee and the Management Council are both dominated by legislative leaders, the Committee could be accused of favoring
its own members. The Council consists of the president of the Senate, the
speaker of the House, the majority and minority leaders of the two
houses, two senators and two representatives selected by the party caucuses
of the two houses meeting separately, and one member selected by the
other ten. Wyo. STAT. § 28-8-102 (1977).
17. WYO. STAT. § 9-4-103(d) (1977).
18. WYO. STAT. § 9-4-102(b) (1977).
19. Interview with Joe Meyer, Assistant Director, Legislative Service Office
(August 30, 1979). Mr. Meyer was active in the negotiations between the
Committee and the Governor's office.
20. The Rules Committee considered nine bills during the 1977 session, out of
655 which were considered in the House. Legislative Service Office, Forty-
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negotiations which delayed the bill. Second, in the correspondence prior to the session, Herschler expressed his
opinion that the governor should have primary control of
the bureaucracy, and Representative Donley agreed."' The
pre-session amendments had increased the governor's control,
but not to the extent Herschler desired. The new subsection
made the governor's power clear. Third, and most significantly, the Governor had the opportunity to veto the bill
without threat of an override,22 and he had motives for a
Nevertheless, he allowed the ARRA to become efveto.2
fective without his signature in order to complete his part
of the compromise.
The amendment significantly increased the governor's
control over agency rule-making and did little or nothing
to augment legislative control. It also complicated rulemaking by including the governor at three stages of the
process."
In Committee of the Whole, the House accepted the
Rules Committee amendments and adopted three more
The first permitted the Management
minor amendments.2
21.
22.

23.

24.

25.

Fourth Legislature House Bill Committee Referrals (1977) (on file at the
LSO).
Letter from Governor Ed Herschler to Representative Russ Donley (November 29, 1976) ; letter from Representative Russ Donley to Gerald Fox,
Research Associate, Legislative Service Office (December 7, 1976).
The Governor received the enrolled act Friday, February 25. The session
adjourned Monday, February 28. DIGEST OF HOUSE JOURNAL, 44th Legis.,
Gen. Sess. 261, 528 (1977). As a result, the Governor had fifteen days
after adjournment to act on the bill. WYo. CONST. art. IV, § 8.
The Governor has made his disdain for the Act known on several occasions.
Letter from Governor Ed Herschler to Secretary of State Thyra Thomson
(March 15, 1977) ; letter from Herschler to Senator Don Northrup (February 25, 1978).
The governor may amend or rescind rules after receiving the Council's
recommendations, WYo. STAT. § 28-9-106(b) (1977), he may disapprove a
rule before it is filed, Wyo. STAT. § 9-4-103(d) (1977), and he may veto
a legislative order which disapproves a rule, JOINT RULES OF THE WYOMING
LEGISLATURE, 45th Legis., Gen. Sess. Rule 12-1 (1979).
That and other incongruities in the ARRA and between the ARRA
and the APA which the Committee's amendment produced led one commentator to charge the ARRA with being "poorly drafted." Comment,
supra note 7, at 189. For example, the original bill directed the LSO to
make certain determinations in reviewing rules. The LSO would have
reported its findings to the rules review committee, which would have been
authorized to make the same determinations. The Committee amended
both sections by replacing the LSO and the rules committee with the
Management Council. The result is an apparent duplication-the Council is
authorized to examine rules and make determinations, and also required
to make the same determinations when reviewing rules. In the hurried
business of legislating, such problems are to be expected.
DIGEST OF HOUSE JOURNAL, 44th Legis., Gen. Sess. 260-61 (1977).
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Council to delegate rule review functions to subcommittees
of the Council. The second was a minor verbal change. The
third left it to the Management Council's discretion whether
to send rule reviews to the standing committee with appropriate jurisdiction.
The final amendment to the bill occurred on second
reading in the House. 6 Representative Donley added three
words which make Wyoming's rule review process unique.
The amendment is italicized in the following quotation
from the Act: "If the legislature approves by legislative order a council recommendation to prohibit the implementation
or enforcement of any rule, the rule may not be implemented
or enforced.""
This amendment solved the problem created by Article
III, Section 6 of the Wyoming Constitution, which prohibits
the introduction of bills other than the budget bill during
the Budget Session "unless placed on call by a two-thirds
vote of either house.""5 If legislative action against rules
could only be carried out by bill, and such a bill failed
introduction, the rule could be in effect for as long as
twenty-two months before legislative action. A "legislative
order" is not subject to the constitutional constraints, so the
maximum delay is less than a year.
The rule review bill sailed after that. On third reading
in the House, it passed by a vote of 49 to 12." In the Senate,
the bill went to the Rules Committee and was returned in
four days. On third reading, it received 29 aye votes, and
one no vote.3" The bill became law without the Governor's
signature, and appears as chapter 190, the last chapter of
the 1977 Wyoming Session Laws."
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 261.
WYO. STAT. § 28-9-107(c) (1977).
WYO. CONST. art. III, § 6.
DIGEST OF HOUSE JOURNAL, 44th Legis., Gen. Sess. 261 (1977). There was
also one abstention.
30. Id. at 261.
31. Codified as Wyo. STAT. §§ 28-9-101 to 28-9-108, and 9-4-102 to 9-4-105
(1977). Neither the legislature nor the Governor are completely comfortable with the rule review process. In 1979, the Joint Judiciary Interim
Committee introduced a bill amending the ARRA. As it passed both houses,
the bill added a definition of "legislative order," gave the governor more
time and a better opportunity to respond to legislative recommendations,
removed the Management Council's authority to consider constitutional
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THE LEGISLATURE'S POWER

The Governor has opposed the ARRA almost since it
became law."2 Among the arguments he raises is one on
constitutionality under the separation of powers clause, an
argument that has been raised concerning rule review procedures in other states and concerning the federal equivalent
of rule review-the congressional veto.
The constitutionality of the congressional veto has been
debated at length,3" without a victor emerging. "At this
time, the American government has no 'principle' that congressional veto of administrative rules is or is not compatible
with the Constitution.""5 In spite of the more strict separation of powers clause in the Wyoming Constitution, the
doubts about the constitutionality of the ARRA are unnecessary. 5
For analytical purposes, the ARRA can be broken into
two parts. The first encompasses all of the rule review
process except the legislative order. This part only adds to
the procedural burden of agencies, which the legislature
may do constitutionally. The second part is the legislative

32.
33.

34.
35.

questions, and allowed the Council to hold rules in abeyance. H.B. 117,
45th Legis., Gen. Sess. (1979). The Governor vetoed the bill. DIGEST OF
HOUSE JOURNAL, 45th Legis., Gem. Sess. 115-17 (1979).
See note 23, supra.
Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A
Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455 (1977); Abourezk, The
Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogative, 52 IND. L.J. 323 (1977); Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of
Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1369 (1977); Miller & Knapp, The
CongressionalVeto: Preserving the ConstitutionalFramework, 52 IND. L.J.
367 (1977); McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119 (1977) ; Stewart, Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J. LEGIS. 593 (1976); Watson, Congress Steps Out:
A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983
(1975).
1 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 77 (2d. 1978) (hereinafter
cited as DAVIS).
WYo. CONST. art. II,§ 1. Whereas the congressional veto prevents any
rule from becoming effective for a designated period during which either
house of Congress may veto the rule by majority vote, the ARRA never
delays the effective date of rules and vetoes rules only when both houses
and the governor agree.
The U.S. Supreme Court has made it plain that the separation of
powers doctrine is not a technical legal rule. The constitutional convention
rejected a strict separation in favor of some overlapping duties which
provide checks on all branches. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) ;
see also Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 441-46
(1977). Wyoming's court has not indicated how strictly article II is to
be interpreted.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss1/6

8

Singer: Administrative Regulation Review - Act II

1980

ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION REVIEW

215

order. Because the legislative order must survive the normal
law-making process, including the governor's veto, there can
be no violation of separation of powers.
A.

The ARRA's Procedural Requirements

Read from the perspective of an agency about to propose rules, the ARRA does three things. It requires submission of the proposed rules to the LSO; it gives the governor a firm hand in the content of the rules after the
Management Council has made its recommendations; and
it requires the governor's signature before filing the rules
with the secretary of state. The last two of these are controls over the substantive content of rules, but both are
controls held by the governor. Because the agency and the
governor are in the same branch of government, those controls cannot violate the separation of powers.3"
The agency's only dealing with other branches of government comes from the first requirement, which mandates
submission of the rules to the LSO. This procedural burden
of the ARRA is trivial when compared to the notice, hearing,
statement of reasons, filing and other requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) .1
The legislature's power to impose procedural requirements on rule-making is beyond question. 8 Rule-making
is a legislative power.3 An agency cannot write rules unless
the legislature delegates such authority.
Since the legislature grants the power, it may also
impose conditions upon its exercise, such as the procedural
requirements of the APA and the ARRA. By doing so, the
legislature does not infringe upon the executive's prerogatives or violate the separation of powers clause.
36. WYO. CONST. art. II, § 1 establishes only three branches of government
which are separate,
37. WYo. STAT. § 9-4-103 (1977).
38. In fact, the legislative power to impose the procedures of the APA has
never been questioned in Wyoming, and apparently not much more frequently elsewhere.
39. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv.
L. REV. 1667, 1672 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Stewart).
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Although the ARRA's only imposition on agencies is
procedural, it does more than establish a procedural barrier.
The ARRA directs the LSO to review rules and report to
the Management Council.4" In doing so, the LSO interprets
the constitution and the statutes. The Council then makes
determinations which are based on constitutional and statutory interpretations.41 Moreover, the governor must make
similar determinations before approving a rule.2 The argument has been raised that these are judicial functions and
their exercise under the ARRA violates the separation of
powers doctrine."
The argument proves too much. First, it implies that
the LSO may not give legal opinions to legislators or legislative committees. Such a result is as absurd as telling
attorneys in private practice that they may not give legal
opinions to their clients. The courts do not have the time
to address the legal problems of every legislator, let alone
every person. Second, the argument denies the Management
Council, or any legislative committee, authority to act on
questions which raise legal or constitutional issues. Such
a result would bring all legislative activity to a standstill.
Third, the argument denies the governor the power to act
on constitutional questions. Arguably, the governor would
be acting outside his authority by vetoing legislation on
constitutional grounds.44 The constitution simply does not
hinder governmental processes in this way.4
Those who operate the government, like persons in the
private sector, must make judgments based upon informed
legal opinion. Though the courts' constitutional and statutory interpretations are the most authoritative, their's is
not a monopoly on the power to interpret. The ARRA does
not reduce the courts' authority, or subject it to the control
of another branch.
40.
41.
42.
43.

WYO. STAT. § 28-9-104(a) (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 28-9-104(c) (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 9-4-103(d) (1977).
Comment, supra note 7, at 198-201.

44. Half of Governor Herschler's 1979 vetoes were on constitutional grounds.
45. Cf. Alcala v. Board of Barber Examiners, 365 F. Supp. 560, 564 (D. Wyo.
1973) (federal court abstained from deciding constitutional questions in
part because Board had not considered them. "It is clear that administra-
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Legislative Orders

The one real power of the legislature under the ARRA
is the legislative order. It is the one part of the ARRA
which might justifiably encounter difficulties on separation of powers grounds. On its face, the statute allows the
legislature, acting alone, to prohibit the implementation
and enforcement of an administrative rule by adopting a
legislative order.4" Like most things, the ARRA is not
as simple as it seems. Even though rule-making is a function delegated by the legislature, the legislature may not
interfere in agency rule-making at will. Moreover, the
Wyoming Constitution requires the governor's signature on
every bill, order or resolution except those relating to the
transaction of the legislature's business." This requirement
unquestionably applies to legislative orders.
The veto power may never have been discussed during
Once the ARRA
consideration of the rule review bill."
and adrecognized
was
problem
became law, however, the
dressed. The joint rules of the House and Senate were
amended to require the order to be sent to the governor in
accordance with the constitutional requirement.49 As a result, the legislative order is now treated as a bill in all
respects but one - it may be introduced in a budget session
without a two-thirds vote of one house.5" The governor's
veto power is preserved.
The adoption of the joint rule also resolved any separation of powers questions about the legislative order since
the legislative order uses the law-making process. Although
that process blurs some of the distinctions between the
executive and the legislature, it certainly does not violate
the doctrine of separation of powers." The legislative order
tive agencies are competent to pass upon constitutional issues germane to
proceedings before them.")
46. WYO. STAT. § 28-9-107(c)

(1977).

47. WYO. CONST. art. 1II, § 41 & art. IV, § 8.
48. The legislative order concept was not introduced until second reading in
the House, the last reading in which the bill was amended.
49. JOINT RULES OF THE WYOMING LEGISLATURE, 44th Legis., Budget Sess.,
Rule 12-1 (1978).
50. See text at notes 26-28, supra.

51. Article II excludes from the requirement areas where the separation is
blurred by the Constitution, such as law-making.
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is unique; but an unusual form of enactment need not be
unconstitutional.
C. Changing Times Change Demands
Administrative regulation is a vital part of the governmental system. To some extent, it has been since Washington became president.52 But with the increasing demands
upon government in this century, administrative regulation
has proliferated.
The rise in importance of administrative regulation was
accompanied by the development of administratvie law. The
development faced strong resistance from powerful interest
groups, including the American Bar Association. 3 Those
opposed to the movement toward administrative regulation
found support in at least three legal theories: the theory of
separation of powers, the theory of the rule of law and the
nondelegation doctrine. Each was "a barrier to the development of administrative law and . . . contributed little or
nothing that is affirmative." 4
At the same time these theories were extant, there was
difficulty in finding philosophical support for administraThe traditional model viewed agencies
tive regulation.
as "transmission belts" implementing legislative directives,
with court review to hold agency discretion within statutory
bounds.5" That model became unworkable as government
intervention increased and more discretion was vested in
administrative agencies. During the New Deal, the "expertise" of professional public administrators was offered as a
solution to the problem of discretion, but it failed because
the courts and others recognized that agencies did not pracThe courts then developed an
tice an apolitical science.5
which provides a "surrogate
model
representation"
"interest
political process to ensure the fair representation of a wide
."" The failure of this
range of affected interests ..
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See generally DAVIS, supra note 34, at 15-35.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 147.
See generally Stewart. supra note 39.
Id. at 1671-76.
Id. at 1676-79.
Id. at 1670.
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model to provide a workable philosophical foundation for
administrative law is now evident."
Despite the lack of philosophical support, and despite
strong philosophical opposition, government by administrative regulation has prospered. The barriers to administrative regulation have been overriden, 0 but administrative
law goes on without a firm philosophical footing. It survives
because government could not survive without administrative agencies.
Necessity now calls for different steps. A plethora of
problems associated with administrative government have
been identified: agencies act beyond their authority; they
fail to achieve legislatively mandated goals; they are biased;
and they exercise discretion unreasonably.'
As society depends upon agencies more, their "misconduct" becomes more
significant. The traditional answer to such complaints is
the courts. With the growth of administrative government,
that solution is no longer practical-if indeed it ever was.
The costs of litigation prohibit all but the most severely injured or the very wealthy from pursuing their remedies. 2
Moreover, statutory and constitutional violations by agencies
may not injure a potential litigant directly enough to make
him aware of his injury."3 To depend upon litigation as the
remedy is, in most cases, to have no remedy at all.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 1681-88.
DAVIS, supra note 34. at 147.
Stewart, supra note 39, at 1681-88.
A recent example arose when the Department of Health and Social Services
issued regulations to implement the mandantory immunization of children
act which was passed by the 1979 legislature. Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-4-116 and
21-4-309 (Supp. 1979). The law limited the immunization requirement to
children ten years old or less "entering initially or transferring into"
schools. Obviously, the program would achieve total immunization only
after several years. The Department chose to implement a different program which required all children ten years old or less to be immunized
immediately. The costs to parents and schools of the legislature's longterm program were certainly less than the Department's immediate program, but the difference is not great enough to warrant litigation. See
Legislative Service Office, Administrative Rule Review Report Number
157 (June 21, 1979). As to whether the legislature's or the Department's
program is better policy, no opinion is expressed here.
63. The Wyomng Department of Agriculture's regulations under the Dairy
Marketing Act, WYO. STAT. §§ 11-36-101 to 11-36-110 (1977), prohibit
selling dairy products in this state which have been processed out-of-state
at a price below that set by the Department for in-state dairy products.
This violates the U.S. Constitution's prohibition of burdens on interstate
commerce. See Legislative Service Office, Administrative Rule Review
Report Number 118 (November 6, 1978). Wyoming consumers are injured
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Legal commentators are discussing means of controlling agency discretion. Kenneth Culp Davis recommends
"an affirmative reinterpretation"of the theories of separation of powers, rule of law, and nondelegation.8 4 Richard
Stewart sees either of two developments possible: the further application of the interest representation model, or the
use of a classification scheme to conform control techniques
to each agency's characteristics." The federal government
and many state governments are experimenting with methods to control administrative excess. Recently a federal
agency's discretion was limited through deregulation,"0 and
the same action has been proposed for some of Wyoming's
regulatory agencies." S o m e states, including Wyoming,
have adopted sunset legislation to force agencies to justify
their continued existence."8 Wyoming's legislature has also
made an effort to gain better control of the appointment
process.6" Administrative rule review is among the solutions being tested and discussed."0
Necessity now calls for developments to set reasonable
restrictions on administrative processes. Those with an
interest in unfettered administrative action will oppose the
developments, just as the growth of administrative law was
opposed by conservative forces at an earlier time. Necessity
prevailed then, and it should prevail now. The ARRA is not
the only way of controlling administrative agencies, nor is
it the best. But in its short life in Wyoming, it has proved
that it is worthy of continuation.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

69.
70.

by the regulations, but most are unaware of the higher price they pay or
the reason they pay it.
DAVIS, supra note 34, at 147 (emphasis in source).
Stewart, supra note 39, at 1805-13.
Many of the Civil Aeronautics Board's powers were removed by Pub. L.
No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978). Trucking regulation is now under fire.
S. 710, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
See, e.g., H.B. 53 (milk order funding) & S.F. 168 (prevailing wage act),
45th Legis., Gen. Sess. (1979).
WYo. STAT. §§ 28-10-101 to 28-10-103 (1977).
WYO. STAT. §§ 28-11-101 to 28-11-103 (1977).
Thirty four states have adopted formal legislative regulation review
systems. LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION
TIONAL

CONFERENCE

OF

STATE

LEGISLATURES,

LEGISLATIVE REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE

RESTORING

COMMITTEE, NATHE BALANCE:

REGULATIONS 8 (1979).
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III. REVIEWING RULE REVIEW
Whatever legal and constitutional arguments are made
in its support, rule review must be judged ultimately on its
effectiveness. Unless it does something worthwhile, it should
not be retained.
The original goal of rule review was to impose some
checks on the bureaucracy. The experience with Wyoming's
ARRA to date suggests that it goes a long way toward
fulfilling that goal, while providing other benefits. It could
be even more effective if some minor changes were made
in the Act.
A.

Controlling the Bureaucracy

The ARRA gives the legislative branch mostly advisory
powers. The one method it has for making rules conform
with law, the legislative order, is proposed infrequently and
is usually unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the rule review process is valuable. Through voluntary compliance by agencies
with LSO and Management Council recommendations, and
an occasional legislative order, rules are brought into conformance with law.
The rule review process in Wyoming consists of four
official steps. First, the LSO prepares a report to the
Management Council, which consists of recommendations
to the Council concerning the rules.7 ' Most rules are found
to be in compliance with law."3 Second, the Management
Council acts upon the LSO report and notifies the governor. 3
That is usually the end of the matter. Third, in a few cases,
where noncompliance is significant and the agency is unwilling to change its rules, the Council proposes a legislative
order.74 Fourth, the legislature may adopt and the governor
may sign the legislative order. 5
Behind and between the official steps, a great deal
more goes on. The LSO's report is only a recommendation
WYo. STAT. § 28-9-104(a) (1977).
72. A review of the rule review reports numbered 101 to 150 reveals 31
findings that the rules were within statutory authority.
73. WYo. STAT. § 28-9-106(a) (1977).
74. WYO. STAT. § 28-9-107(a) (v) (1977).
75. Wyo. STAT. § 28-9-107(b) & (c) (1977).
71.
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to the Management Council, but a copy is sent to the agency
which submitted the rules. Before the Management Council
meets to act upon the report, it is likely that representatives
of the agency will meet with LSO staff to discuss the report.
As a result of these conversations, the LSO may revise its
recommendation to the Management Council or the agency
may withdraw the rules or amend them to conform to the
statutes.
Generally, the LSO and the agency are interested in
resolving differences and conforming the rules with law.
An agency may feel compelled to adopt a questionable regulation became of pressure from interest groups"6 or in order
to establish an effective program." Agencies seldom ignore
or violate the law intentionally. Often they interpret the
statute differently than the LSO. The LSO staff may agree
not to press the issue when the agency's interpretation is
reasonable, or the agency may decide the LSO is correct and
change the rule.
An agency which rewrites rules in response to LSO
objections is not acting because of a statutory mandate.
Neither the LSO nor the Management Council can force
an agency to amend its rules. Agencies respond to the LSO's
suggestions for a variety of reasons. Among them are the
avoidance of legislative orders,7 s the general need to remain
on good terms with the legislature, the elimination of possible legal challenges to agency actions, and the simple desire
to act within legal bounds.
Before the Management Council acts upon the LSO
report, many problems in the rules have been resolved. 9
76. The Department of Fire Prevention and Electrical Safety has been under
intense pressure from unions and some corporations to include corporations as "persons" when interpretng the statutory exclusion of "a person
on his own property" from electrical licensing requirements.
77. The Department of Agriculture has unconstitutionally banned importation into Wyoming of dairy goods processed at prices below those.set by
Wyoming's dairy market orders. The Department argues, with justification, that to lift the ban would make the dairy market order program
ineffective.
78. This threat appeared more real after the 1979 session, because two legislative orders passed. Agencies have cooperated with the LSO more willingly
since the session.
79. Of eighteen rules with statutory or constitutional problems identified in
rule review reports 113 to 150, four were amended or withdrawn prior
to Management Council action. Three problems required statutory solutions, so the Council took no action on the rules.
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If the agency disagrees with the LSO report, the agency
may argue its case to the Management Council. Regardless
of the Council's decision, the agency is under no compulsion
to conform its rules to the Council's directives. The Council's
only function at this point in the process is to make recommendations to the governor. 0
B.

Rule-making and the Governor

Under the ARRA, the governor can control the destiny
of rules at three stages:" by ordering the amendment or
recision of proposed rules after receiving a Management
Council recommendation;82 by refusing to approve rules
when submitted for his signature prior to filing with the
secretary of state ;83 or by approving or vetoing a legislative
order which prohibits the implementation or enforcement
of the rules."
These powers granted in the ARRA, plus the enactment of two legislative orders in the 1979 session, prompted
the Governor and the Attorney General to assume a greater
role in agency rule-making. Agencies have been urged to
consult with the attorney general's office at an early stage
of rule drafting,85 and the Governor has indicated that rules
should not be submitted to him unless approved by an assistant attorney general."0
Because the governor has final authority over rules,
the suggestions made by the attorney general or the governor will probably carry more weight with agencies than
LSO recommendations. The result may well be rules which
not only comply with law, but which are organized, comprehensible and unambiguous.8 Rules should be at least as
80.

81.
82.
83.
84.

85.
86.
87.

§ 28-9-106 (a) (1977). The agency which adopted or proposed
the rule which is reviewed also receives a copy of the Management
Council's recommendations.
See Comment, supra note 7, at 192-95.
WYO. STAT. § 28-9-106(b) (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 9-4-103(d) (1977).
WYO. STATo § 28-9-107 (1977).
Memorandum from Pete Mulvaney, Deputy Attorney General, to Staff
Attorneys (May 16, 1979).
Memorandum from Governor Herschler to State Agencies (May 14, 1979).
See Memorandum of Bruce Salzburg, Assistant Attorney General, to
John Troughton, Attorney General (April 19, 1979).
WYO. STAT.
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understandable as the laws they interpret and implement.
The governor can make sure they are.
C. Rules and the Laws
One function of the rule review process which is often
over-looked is its potential for identifying statutes which
are in need of amendment or repeal. As unintelligible as
some rules are, there are statutes which are worse. Wyoming
has had a brief time in which to compile statutes which are
outdated, incomprehensible and conflicting. Nevertheless,
the collection inside the ten green volumes is remarkable."
Agencies develop ways of understanding ambiguities
and resolving conflicts within the statutes they use. Seldom
does anyone question the agency's interpretation. Once comfortable with an interpretation and the way it operates, the
agency has little reason to go to the legislature with a request for changes in the law. By asking for statutory
changes, the agency may invite unwanted legislative scrutiny or may find itself with duties it never sought.
The agency is obliged to do its best with unworkable
statutes. However, when an agency resolves a conflict or
ambiguity in the statutes, it assumes a policy-making function which belongs to the legislature. The fault lies not with
the agency, but with the legislature, and the cure must come
from the same place.
In reviewing rules, the LSO and, indirectly, the Management Council have two ways of discovering problems
with the statutes. The first is in preparing the report. In
comparing the rules to the statutes, the LSO necessarily
uncovers conflicts and ambiguities. These problems are
identified in the rule review reports. Second, after the
agency receives the report, but before Management Council
action, LSO staff may discuss the rules with staff from the
agency, and further problems in the statutes may be identified. An effort is made to bring such statutory problems
to the Management Council's attention.
88. The transportation code, the criminal code and the fire prevention and
electrical safety statutes are good examples. The ARRA itself is not a
model of clarity.
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The Management Council is authorized to introduce
bills. In 1979, it introduced five, three of which were directed
toward clarifying statutes which had been identified as
problems through the rule review process.8" The Management Council has also begun directing interim committees
to study statutory problems which are uncovered through
rule review.9
Individual legislators also introduced bills which addressed problems identified through rule review. In fact,
the force of the two legislative orders adopted in 1979 was
tempered significantly by the enactment of bills introduced
by other members. Legislative Order Number 1 prohibited
the enforcement of a Department of Revenue and Taxation
rule exempting newspapers from the sales tax." All sales
tax exemptions are specifically enumerated in the statutes, 2
and the addition to that list by means other than statutory
amendment is clearly beyond the agency's authority. However, the exemption dated back to the depression era. The
Management Council decided not to introduce a bill providing the exemption, but two legislators did,93 and one of the
bills was adopted.
Thus, the legislature made the point
that the Department could not exceed its statutory authority,
while it authorized the Department to continue the policy.
Legislative Order Number 2 related to rules of the
Department of Fire Prevention and Electrical Safety. 5
Eight sections of the Department's rules were declared
void and unenforceable. However, the legislature also recognized that the Department's authorizing statutes were
89.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

S.F. 94, 45th Legis., Gen. Sess. (1979), attempted to eliminate constitutional problems in the enforcement of the dairy marketing act which
were identified in Legislative Service Office, Administrative Rule Review
Report Number 118 (November 6, 1978). H.B. 462, 45th Legis., Gen. Sess.
(1979), addressed the State Financial Institutions Board's practice of
granting bank application fee refunds which were not authorized by
statute. See Legislative Service Office, Administrative Rule Review Report Number 79 (April 24, 1978). H.B. 199, 45th Legis., Gen. Sess.
(1979), which became 1979 Wyo. SESS. LAWS Ch. 27, codified as Wyo.
STAT. § 39-6-405 (Supp. 1979), concerned the sales tax exemption for
school annuals.
Minutes of the Management Council 3 (August 13, 1979).
1979 Wyo. SEss. LAWS L.O. 1.
WYo. STAT. § 39-6-405(a) (1977).
S.F. 152 (Arney) & H.B. 348 (Lummis), 45th Legis., Gen. Sess. (1979).
WYo. STAT. § 39-6-405 (Supp. 1979).
1979 Wyo. SEss. LAws L.O. 2.
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out-dated, conflicting and difficult to understand, and
amended them substantially. 6
The legislature may have spoken with a soft voice in
these two instances, but the message was clear. Government
agencies possess only the authority which is granted by law.
They are obliged to remain within that authority and to
seek greater authority from the legislature.
Improving Rule Review
The ARRA does not give the Management Council the
power either to hold rules in abeyance or to take action
against rules on grounds other than noncompliance with
constitutional, procedural or statutory requirements. Other
states have provided these powers to their rule review committees." The results appear to be large staffs and big
budgets" without more effective rule review. The ARRA
works well enough that giving the Management Council
additional powers seems unnecessary and unwise. Agencies
cooperate now, so the Council does not need a larger club
with which to induce cooperation. Rather, the ARRA needs
amendments which will make it easier for agencies to cooperate. Two changes would be most helpful: first, the
ARRA should be clarified to make rule review an orderly
process, and second, the responsibility for rule review
should be vested in a body other than the Management
Council.
D.

Clarifying the Process
When introduced as H.B. 205, the ARRA set forth a
relatively precise pattern of events and functions for rule
1.

96. WYO. STAT. §§ 35-9-106, 35-9-116, 35-9-121, 35-9-132 to 35-9-136, 35-9-138,
35-9-140, 35-9-110, and 35-9-121 (Supp. 1979). It remains to be seen if
any real improvement was made. WYo. STAT. § 35-9-135 requires the use
of licensed electricians for electrical work in or on buildings except by
a person on his own property and in certain other instances. The former
statute had also excluded farms and ranches larger than forty -acres,
mines, and railroads. The Department is under pressure to retain those
exclusions through a broad interpretation of "persons" and the legislative
intent is anything but clear.
97. Eleven states authorize the rule review committee to hold rules in abeyance. RESTORING THE BALANCE, supra note 70, at 41-43. At least four
states specifically authorize review of rules on non-statutory grounds
such as impact on the economy, government operations and affected
parties. Id. at 31-39.
98. Id. at 21-22.
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review. By the time it passed, the ARRA granted authority
to so many so often that understanding the law was an
obstacle to implementing it. Based on the working arrangements which have been developed, the ARRA should now
be amended to state clearly each step of the rule review
process and the order in which the steps proceed. The four
steps which follow seem most logical:
First, agencies should be required to send proposed rules to the LSO thirty days prior to final
adoption. The rules should be in final form," and
all APA requirements should be complete. °0 Agencies should be required to utilize the attorney general's assistance in rule drafting.1 '
Second, the rule review committee's recommendations should be sent to the governor five
days before final adoption of the rules.0 2 If
the committee makes no recommendation, it should
lose its opportunity for input. This would force the
committee to meet frequently, or to decide which
rules demand committee action and which do not.
The uncertainty which now occurs between a negative LSO rule review report and the Management Council meetinz could be reduced. If the
legislature asks efficiency of state agencies, it
should not hinder their operations unnecessarily.
Third, the governor should have his formal
opportunity for input in the last five days before
adoption.'
With the rule review committee's
recommendations and the advice of the attorney
general before him, the governor should have the
99. If the LSO and the Managyement Council are not to act as rule drafters
and advisors, then the rules should be final. Informal opinions can be
obtained by agencies from the LSO staff without specific statutory
authority, although some conflict of interest problems arise when LSO
staff review rules which they assisted in drafting.
100. The ARRA's direction to review rules for procedural compliance makes
no sense unless the rules have gone through most procedural steps.
101. The attorney general is required to be available to assist agencies in
drafting, but is utilized too infrequently. WYo. STAT. § 9-4-104(d) (1977).
102. Present law authorizes 60 days for the LSO to conduct its review and
report to the Council. and 30 days after the LSO submits its report for
the Council to make its recommendations to the governor. Even these
generous time limits are ocassionally ignored.
103. One can assume that particularly significant rules will receive his attention at a much earlier date.
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power to reject, alter or approve the proposed
rules." 4
Fourth, the legislative order should be retained and the occasions for its use should be
specified. Two occasions are appropriate: 1) when
the governor approves a rule in spite of a rule
review committee objection on clear constitutional,
procedural or statutory grounds; and 2) when the
committee makes no recommendation, any member
of the legislature should be allowed to introduce a
legislative order for major constitutional, procedural or statutory problems.
These changes would be beneficial to all who are affected by rule review. Agencies would be certain of their
obligations and the timetable under the act. The attorney
general's staff would be involved at early stages of drafting,
where their input can be most useful. The LSO staff's time
would be used more economically. The legislature would
have its opportunity for review, and the governor would
have complete information when deciding whether to approve rules.
2.

The Rule Review Committee

The rule review bill began with a select committee,
but was amended to give the rule review function to the
Management Council. There were good reasons for doing
that - travel and salary expenses could be saved, and since
the members of the Management Council are chosen by the
rest of the legislators," 5 the Council should fairly represent
the views of the legislature. Those points are still valid,
but other considerations should now prevail. Rule review
should be delegated to a permanent joint standing committee.
Four characteristics of the Council make it less effective at rule review than another committee could be. First,
the Council meets too seldom. Bi-monthly or even tri-monthly
104. These are powers which the governor now possesses. under the ARRA.
A question not specifically addressed in the ARRA is if the governor
should be limited to acting on constitutional, procedural and statutory
grounds, or if he should be able to amend or reject rules for any reason.
105. Six seats on the Council are filled by party leaders, who are selected
by caucuses. Four -members are selected by the party caucuses of their
respective chambers. One member is selected by the other ten.
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meetings are inadequate to watch over a full-time government."' A rule review committee should meet no less than
every three to four weeks. Second, the Council is too large.
A smaller committee could work more expeditiously and
would spend less money for travel and salary. Third, the
Council has too many other matters on its collective mind.
The Council oversees the LSO and is the major channel of
communication with the legislature between sessions. The
members lack the time and the interest to devote to thorough
rule review.'
Fourth, the Council does not divorce itself
from non-statutory considerations, which the ARRA demands. Rule review in Wyoming is limited. It has legitimacy, in part, because of the limitations. The rule review
committee must act upon statutory language and perceptions of legislative intent, not upon personal political
views. 0 5
The ideal rule review committee might have six to
eight members who have few other committee assignments.
They should meet regularly and frequently. The committee
should be empowered to request assistance from other
standing committees in interpreting laws and to introduce
bills when statutes are encountered which need clarification
or modernization.
CONCLUSION
The struggle for and against the ARRA is the same
struggle which pervades administrative law - it is the
need to find legitimacy in the use of power. Agencies exercise tremendous power. Yet, the elections which legitimize
executive officers and legislatures in their acts, and the
multitude of factors which legitimize courts, do not apply
to administrative agencies. In previous years, agencies
have found fleeting legitimacy in the "transmission belt",
The Council met eleven times from January 1978 to September 1979, or
approximately once every two months.
107. This is evidenced by the amount of time the Council gives to rule review.
A set of rules may receive five to ten minutes. If all of the members
were prepared, that might be sufficient, but often the rules and reports
have gone unread.
108. The Management Council may be more likely to engage in partisan
politics since all but one member hold a post in, or owe their Council
seat to the party.
106.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1980

23

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 15 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 6

230

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XV

"expertise", and "interest representation" models of administrative law. These models have failed, and the search
continues.
Some help may be found in the nondelegation doctrine.
Though the doctrine has lost much of its force, its basic
premise retains acceptability. That premise is that ultimately, elected officials should be responsible for the conduct of government. The ARRA is based upon that same
premise. It lays in the governor's hands the power to control executive agency rule-making. It also provides a check
upon the executive branch which the legislature exercises.
The check is necessary and appropriate. Applying what
Senator Jacob Javits once wrote about the congressional veto
to Wyoming's ARRA, "That history already records massive
delegations of legislative power to the executive branch should
from recapturing some
not prevent . . . [the legislature]
'1
of that lawmaking power. 09

109. Javits & Klein, supra note 33, at 496.
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